State v. Scott

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JENNIFER ANN SCOTT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0414
FILED 3-28-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. V1300CR820060048
The Honorable Michael R. Bluff, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Oliverson Law, PLLC, Tempe
By David Tangren
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Jennifer Ann Scott appeals her conviction of negligent child
abuse. We received a brief from Scott’s counsel in accordance with Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969),
certifying that, after a diligent search of the record, counsel found no
arguable question of law that was not frivolous. Scott had the opportunity
to file a supplemental brief but did not. Counsel asks this court to search
the record for reversible error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30
(App. 1999). After reviewing the record, we affirm Scott’s conviction and
sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In November 2005, an officer from the Department of Public
Safety stopped a vehicle occupied by Scott and her six-year-old son. Upon
approach, the officer smelled “a very strong odor of burned marijuana that
was coming from the passenger compartment[.]” The driver, Rustin Shinn,
was arrested at the scene for driving under the influence of marijuana with
a minor child in the vehicle. When questioned, Scott admitted she smoked
marijuana with Shinn earlier in the day. She was not arrested at the scene,
but in January 2006, a grand jury indicted her on one count of child abuse
for causing a child less than 15 years of age and under her care to be placed
in a dangerous situation. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3623(B)(3), 13-701, 13-702, 13-801.

¶3 Scott’s release conditions gave notice of her right to be present
at future proceedings and a warning that her trial could continue in her
absence. She appeared at all pretrial conferences. In May 2006, Scott moved
to amend the conditions of her release, specifically asking the court to allow
her to travel to and from Michigan, her planned permanent residence. Scott
stated she understood the conditions of release and her upcoming court
obligations. The court granted her motion.

¶4 The August 2006 trial proceeded without Scott because she
could not afford travel back to Arizona. The court began with a

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Decision of the Court

voluntariness hearing about Scott’s statements to the responding officer
and concluded the statements were voluntary. At the end of the two-day
trial, the jury unanimously found Scott guilty of negligent child abuse. The
court subsequently issued a warrant for her arrest.

¶5 The outstanding warrant lingered for nearly 16 years. Then,
in July 2022, Scott moved to quash the warrant and proceed with
sentencing. The court ordered a presentencing report and conducted a
sentencing hearing. The court sentenced her to 30 months of probation with
120 days of on-order jail time, probation service fees, and 100 hours of
community service. Scott timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶6 We take the facts from the record at trial and view those facts
in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions. State v. Harm, 236
Ariz. 402, 404 n.2 (App. 2015). We have read and considered counsel’s brief
and reviewed the entire record for reversible error. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at
300. We identified none.

¶7 The record reflects the superior court afforded Scott all her
constitutional and statutory rights, and the proceedings were conducted in
accordance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Scott was
represented by counsel at all critical stages, and her presence at trial was
voluntarily waived. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1; State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557,
571–72, ¶¶ 53–54 (2003) (a defendant’s absence is presumptively voluntary
when she had personal notice of: the time of the proceeding, her right to be
present at the proceeding, and a warning that the proceeding would go
forward in her absence).

¶8 The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the
charged offense, the State’s burden of proof, and Scott’s presumption of
innocence. At sentencing, Scott had the opportunity to be heard, and the
court stated on the record the evidence and factors it considered in
imposing the sentences. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.9, 26.10. Our review reveals
no fundamental error. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300 (“An exhaustive search of
the record has failed to produce any prejudicial error.”).

CONCLUSION

¶9 We affirm Scott’s conviction and sentence. Counsel has
“diligently investigated the possible grounds for appeal” and is permitted
to withdraw. Anders, 386 U.S. at 741–42. Counsel must inform Scott of this
decision and her future options before withdrawing. State v. Shattuck, 140

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Decision of the Court

Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Scott has 30 days from the date of this decision to
proceed, if she wishes, with a pro per motion for reconsideration or petition
for review.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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